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Abstract
We study two forms of a symmetric cooperative game played by three
players, one classical and other quantum. In its classical form making
a coalition gives advantage to players and they are motivated to do so.
However in its quantum form the advantage is lost and players are left
with no motivation to make a coalition.
1 Introduction
Many situations in the recent research in quantum games [1, 2, 3] appear to be
based on a general idea that is quite interesting as well. It is to take a classi-
cal game exhibiting certain features, generalize it to quantum domain, and see
how the situation changes in the course of this generalization. In this course
noncooperative games have attracted an earlier attention with the ruling solu-
tion concept of a Nash equilibrium (NE). This development looks reasonable
because in classical game theory as well the earlier research was focused on non-
cooperative games and interest in coalition formation was revived later. Players
in noncooperative games are not able to form binding agreements even if they
may communicate. On the other hand the distinguishing feature of cooperative
games is a strong incentive to work together to receive the largest total payoff.
These games allow players to form coalitions, binding agreements, pay com-
pensations, make side payments etc. In fact, von Neumann and Morgenstern
[4] in their pioneering work in the theory of games offered models of coalition
formation where the strategy of each player consists of choosing the coalition
he wishes to join. In coalition games, that are part of cooperative game the-
ory, the possibilities of the players are described by the available resources of
different groups (coalitions) of players. Joining a group or remaining outside is
part of strategy of a player affecting his/her payoff. Recent work in quantum
games [1, 2, 3] gives rise to a natural and interesting question: what is the
possible quantum mechanical role in cooperative games that are an important
part of the classical game theory? In our opinion it may be quite interesting,
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and fruitful as well, to investigate coalitions in quantum versions of cooperative
games. Our motivation in present paper is to investigate what might happen
to the advantage of forming a coalition in a quantum game compared to its
classical analogue. We rely on the concepts and ideas of von Neumann’s coop-
erative game theory [4] and consider a three-player coalition game in a quantum
form. We then compare it to the classical version of the game and see how the
advantage of forming a coalition can be affected.
In usual classical analysis of the coalition games the notion of a strategy
disappears; the main features are those of a coalition and the value or worth of
the coalition. The underlying assumption is that each coalition can guarantee
its members a certain amount called the “value of a coalition” [5]. The value
of coalition measures the worth the coalition possesses and is characterized as
the payoff which the coalition can assure for itself by selecting an appropriate
strategy, whereas the ‘odd man’ can prevent the coalition from getting more than
this amount. Using this idea we study cooperative games in quantum settings to
see how advantages of making coalitions can be influenced in the new settings.
The preferable scheme to us to play a quantum game has been recently proposed
by Marinatto and Weber [3]. In this scheme an initial quantum state is prepared
by an arbiter and forwarded to the players. Each player possesses two quantum
unitary and Hermitian operators i.e. the identity I and the inversion or Pauli
spin-flip operator σ. Players apply the operators with classical probabilities on
the initial quantum state and send the quantum state to the ‘measuring agent’
who decides the payoffs the players should get. Interesting feature in this scheme
is that the classical game is reproduced when the initial quantum state becomes
unentangled [3]. Classical game is therefore embedded in the quantum version
of the game.
In this paper using Marinatto and Weber’s scheme [3] we find a quantum
form of a symmetric cooperative game played by three players. In classical
form of this game any two players out of three get an advantage when they
successfully form a coalition and play the same strategy. We find a quantum
form of this game where the advantage for coalition forming is lost and players
are left with no motivation to cooperate.
2 A three player symmetric cooperative game
2.1 Classical form
A classical three person normal form game [5] is given by three non-empty sets
ΣA, ΣB, and ΣC , the strategy sets of the players A,B, and C and three real
valued functions PA, PB , and PC defined on ΣA×ΣB×ΣC . The product space
ΣA×ΣB ×ΣC is the set of all tuples (σA, σB , σC) with σA ∈ ΣA, σB ∈ ΣB and
σC ∈ ΣC . A strategy is understood as such a tuple (σA, σB, σC) and PA, PB ,
PC are payoff functions of the three players. The game is usually denoted as
Γ = {ΣA,ΣB,ΣC ;PA, PB, PC}. Let ℜ = {A,B,C} be the set of players and ℘
be an arbitrary subset of ℜ. The players in ℘ may form a coalition so that, for
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all practical purposes, the coalition ℘ appears as a single player. It is expected
that players in ℜ − ℘ will form an opposing coalition and the game has two
opposing “coalition players” i.e. ℘ and ℜ− ℘.
We study quantum version of an example of a classical three player cooper-
ative game discussed in ref. [5] . Each of three players A,B and C chooses one
of the two strategies 1, 2. If the three players choose the same strategy there is
no payoff; otherwise, the two players who have chosen the same strategy receive
one unit of money each from the ‘odd man.’ Payoff functions PA, PB and PC
for players A,B and C respectively are given as [5]
PA(1, 1, 1) = PA(2, 2, 2) = 0
PA(1, 1, 2) = PA(2, 2, 1) = PA(1, 2, 1) = PA(2, 1, 2) = 1
PA(1, 2, 2) = PA(2, 1, 1) = −2 (1)
with similar expressions for PB and PC . Suppose ℘ = {B,C}; hence ℜ − ℘ =
{A}. The coalition game represented by Γ℘ is given by the following payoff
matrix [5]
[1] [2]
[11] 0 2
[12] −1 −1
[21] −1 −1
[22] 2 0
(2)
Here the strategies [12] and [21] are dominated by [11] and [22]. After eliminat-
ing these dominated strategies the payoff matrix becomes
[1] [2]
[11] 0 2
[22] 2 0
(3)
It is seen that the mixed strategies
1
2
[11] +
1
2
[22] (4)
1
2
[1] +
1
2
[2] (5)
are optimal for ℘ and ℜ − ℘ respectively. With these strategies a payoff 1 for
players ℘ is assured for all strategies of the opponent; hence, the value of the
coalition υ(Γ℘) is 1 i.e. υ({B,C}) = 1. Since Γ is a zero-sum game υ(Γ℘) can
also be used to find υ(Γℜ−℘) as υ({A}) = −1. The game is also symmetric and
one can write
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υ(Γ℘) = 1, and υ(Γℜ−℘) = −1 or
υ({A}) = υ({B}) = υ({C}) = −1
υ({A,B}) = υ({B,C}) = υ({C,A}) = 1 (6)
2.2 Quantum form
In quantum form of this three player game the players implement their strategies
by applying the identity operators in their possession with probabilities p, q, and
r respectively on the initial quantum state. In Marinatto and Weber’s scheme
[3] the Pauli spin-flip or simply the inversion operator σ is then applied with
probabilities (1− p), (1− q), and (1− r) by players A, B and C respectively. If
ρin is the density matrix corresponding to initial quantum state the final state
after players have played their strategies corresponds to [6]
ρfin =
∑
U=I,σ
Pr(UA) Pr(UB) Pr(UC)UA ⊗ UB ⊗ UCρinU
†
A ⊗ U
†
B ⊗ U
†
C (7)
where the unitary and Hermitian operator U can be either I or σ. Pr(UA),
Pr(UB) and Pr(UC) are the probabilities with which players A, B and C apply
the operator U on the initial state respectively. ρfin corresponds to a convex
combination of all possible quantum operations. Let the arbiter prepares the
following three qubit pure initial quantum state
|ψin〉 =
∑
i,j,k=1,2
cijk |ijk〉 , where
∑
i,j,k=1,2
|cijk|
2
= 1 (8)
where the eight basis vectors of this quantum state are |ijk〉 for i, j, k = 1, 2.
The initial state (8) can be imagined as a global state (in a 2⊗2⊗2 dimensional
Hilbert space) of three two-state quantum systems or ‘qubits’. A player applies
the unitary operators I and σ with classical probabilities on ρin during his
‘move’ or ‘strategy’ operation. Fig. 1 shows the scheme to play this three
player quantum game where players B and C form a coalition and player A is
‘leftout’.
Let the matrix of three player game be given by 24 constants αt, βt, γt with
1 ≤ t ≤ 8 [6]. We write the payoff operators for players A,B, and C as [3]
(PA,B,C)oper = α1, β1, γ1 |111〉 〈111|+ α2, β2, γ2 |211〉 〈211|+
α3, β3, γ3 |121〉 〈121|+ α4, β4, γ4 |112〉 〈112|+
α5, β5, γ5 |122〉 〈122|+ α6, β6, γ6 |212〉 〈212|+
α7, β7, γ7 |221〉 〈221|+ α8, β8, γ8 |222〉 〈222| (9)
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Figure 1: A three player quantum game played with Marinatto and Weber’s
scheme. Players B and C form a coalition. I is the identity and σ is the
inversion operator.
Payoffs to players A,B, and C are then obtained as mean values of these oper-
ators [3]
PA,B,C(p, q, r) = Trace [(PA,B,C)operρfin] (10)
where, for convenience, we identify the players’ moves only by the numbers p, q
and r. The cooperative game of eq. (1) with the classical payoff functions PA,
PB and PC for players A B and C respectively, together with the definition of
payoff operators for these players in eq. (9), imply that
α1 = α8 = 0, α3 = α4 = α6 = α7 = 1 and α2 = α5 = −2 (11)
With these constants the payoff to player A, for example, can be found as
PA(p, q, r) =


−4rq − 2p+ 2pr + 2pq + r + q
−4rq + 2p− 2pr − 2pq + 3r + 3q − 2
4rq + 2pr − 2pq − 3r − q + 1
4rq − 2pr + 2pq − r − 3q + 1




|c111|
2
+ |c222|
2
|c211|
2
+ |c122|
2
|c121|
2
+ |c212|
2
|c112|
2
+ |c221|
2


(12)
5
Similarly payoffs to players B and C can be obtained. Classical mixed strategy
payoffs can be recovered from the eq. (12) by taking |c111|
2
= 1. The classical
game is therefore imbedded in its quantum form.
The classical form of this game is symmetric in the sense that payoff to a
player depends on his/her strategy and not on his/her identity. These require-
ments making symmetric the three-player game are written as
PA(p, q, r) = PA(p, r, q) = PB(q, p, r) = PB(r, p, q)
= PC(r, q, p) = PA(q, r, p) (13)
Now in this quantum form of the game PA(p, q, r) becomes same as PA(p, r, q)
when
|c121|
2
+ |c212|
2
= 0, |c112|
2
+ |c221|
2
= 0 (14)
and then payoff to a p player remains same when other two players interchange
their strategies. The symmetry conditions (13) hold if, together with eqs. (14),
following relations are also true
α1 = β1 = γ1, α5 = β6 = γ7
α2 = β3 = γ4, α6 = β5 = γ6
α3 = β2 = γ3, α7 = β7 = γ5
α4 = β4 = γ2, α8 = β8 = γ8
(15)
These form the extra restrictions on the constants of payoff matrix and, together
with the conditions (14), give a three player symmetric game in a quantum form.
No subscript in a payoff expression is then needed and P (p, q, r) represents the
payoff to a p player against two other players playing q and r. The payoff
P (p, q, r) is found as
P (p, q, r) = (|c111|
2
+ |c222|
2
)(−4rq − 2p+ 2pr + 2pq + r + q) +
(|c211|
2
+ |c122|
2
)(−4rq + 2p− 2pr − 2pq + 3r + 3q − 2)
(16)
The term ‘mixed strategy’ in the quantum form of this game is defined as being
a convex combination of quantum strategies with classical probabilities. For
this assume that the pure strategies [1] and [2] correspond to p = 0 and p = 1
respectively. The mixed strategy n [1]+(1−n) [2], where 0 ≤ n ≤ 1, means that
the strategy [1] is played with probability n and [2] with probability (1 − n).
Now suppose the coalition ℘ plays the following mixed strategy
l[11] + (1− l)[22] (17)
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where the strategy [11] means that both players in the coalition ℘ apply the
identity operator I with zero probability. Similarly the strategy [22] can be
defined. The strategy of the coalition in eq. (17) means that the coalition ℘
plays [11] with probability l and [22] with probability 1−l. Similarly we suppose
the player in ℜ− ℘ plays following mixed strategy
m[1] + (1−m)[2] (18)
In this case the payoff to the coalition ℘ is obtained as
P℘ = (lm)P℘[111] + l(1−m)P℘[112] +
(1− l)mP℘[221] + (1− l)(1−m)P℘[222] (19)
where P℘[111] is the payoff to ℘ when all three players play p = 0 i.e. the strategy
[1]. Similarly P℘[221] is coalition payoff when coalition players play p = 1 and
the player in ℜ− ℘ plays p = 0. Now from eq. (16) we get
P℘[111] = 2P (0, 0, 0) = −4(|c211|
2 + |c122|
2)
P℘[112] = 2P (0, 0, 1) = 2(|c111|
2
+ |c222|
2
+ |c211|
2
+ |c122|
2
)
P℘[221] = 2P (1, 1, 0) = 2(|c111|
2
+ |c222|
2
+ |c211|
2
+ |c122|
2
)
P℘[222] = 2P (1, 1, 1) = −4(|c211|
2 + |c122|
2) (20)
Therefore from eq. (19)
P℘ = −4(|c211|
2 + |c122|
2) {lm+ (1 − l)(1−m)}+
2(|c111|
2
+ |c222|
2
+ |c211|
2
+ |c122|
2
) {l(1−m) + (1− l)m} (21)
To find the value of coalition υ(Γ℘) in the quantum game we find
∂P℘
∂m
and
equate it to zero i.e. P℘ is such a payoff to ℘ that the player in ℜ − ℘ cannot
change it by changing his/her strategy given in eq. (18). It gives, interestingly,
l = 12 and the classical optimal strategy of the coalition
1
2 [11] +
1
2 [22] becomes
optimal in the quantum game as well. In the quantum game the coalition then
secures following payoff, also termed as the value of the coalition
υ(Γ℘) = (|c111|
2
+ |c222|
2
)− (|c211|
2
+ |c122|
2
) (22)
Similarly we get the value of coalition for ℜ − ℘ as
υ(Γℜ−℘) = −
{
|c111|
2
+ |c222|
2
+ |c211|
2
+ |c122|
2
}
(23)
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Note that these values reduce to their classical counterparts of eq. (6) when
the initial quantum state becomes unentangled and is given by |ψin〉 = |111〉.
Classical form of the coalition game is, therefore, a subset of its quantum version.
Suppose the arbiter now has at his disposal a quantum state |ψin〉 = c111 |111〉+
c222 |222〉+c211 |211〉+c122 |122〉 such that (|c211|
2
+ |c122|
2
) > (|c111|
2
+ |c222|
2
).
In this case υ(Γ℘) becomes a negative quantity and υ(Γℜ−℘) = −1 because of
the normalization given in eq. (8). A more interesting case is when the arbiter
has the state |ψin〉 = c211 |211〉+ c122 |122〉 at his disposal. Because now both
υ(Γ℘) and υ(Γℜ−℘) are −1 and the players are left with no motivation to form
a coalition. A quantum version of this cooperative game, therefore, exists in
which players are deprived of motivation to form a coalition.
The payoff to a p player against q, r players in classical mixed strategy game
can be obtained from eq. (16) by taking |c111|
2
= 1. It gives
P (p, q, r) = −4rq − 2p+ 2pr + 2pq + r + q (24)
Note that P (p, q, r) + P (q, p, r) + P (r, p, q) = 0 and classical mixed strategy
game is zero-sum and P (℘) +P (ℜ−℘) = 0. The quantum version of this game
is not zero-sum always because from eq. (16) we have
P (p, q, r) + P (q, p, r) + P (r, p, q) = 8(p+ q + r − pq − qr − rp)− 6 (25)
and the quantum game becomes zero-sum only when p+q+r−pq−qr−rp = 34 .
3 Discussion and conclusion
There may appear several guises in which the players can cooperate in a game.
One possibility is that they are able to communicate and, hence, able to correlate
their strategies. In certain situations players can make binding commitments
before or during the play of a game. Even in the post-play behavior the com-
mitments can make players to redistribute their final payoffs. The two-player
games are different from multi-player games in an important aspect. In two-
player games the question before the players is whether to cooperate or not. In
multi-player case the players are faced with a more difficult task. Each player
has to decide which coalition to join. There is also certain uncertainty that
the player faces about the extent to which players outside his coalition may
coordinate their actions. Analysis of cooperative games isolating coalition con-
siderations instead of studying elaborate strategic structures has drawn more
attention. Recent exciting developments in quantum game theory provide a
motivation to see how forming a coalition and its associated advantages can be
influenced in already proposed quantum versions of these cooperative games.
To study this we selected an interesting but simple cooperative game as well as
a recently proposed scheme telling how to play a quantum game. We allowed
the players in the quantum version of the game to form a coalition similar to
the classical game. The underlying assumption in this approach is that because
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the arbiter, responsible for providing three qubit pure quantum initial states
to be later unitarily manipulated by the players, can forward a quantum state
that correspond to the classical game, therefore, other games corresponding to
different initial pure quantum states are quantum forms of the classical game.
This assumption, for example, reduces the problem of finding a quantum version
of the classical coalition game we considered, with an interesting property that
the advantage of making a coalition is lost, to finding some pure initial quantum
states. We showed that such quantum states can be found and, therefore, there
are quantum versions of the three-player coalition game where the motivation
for coalition formation is lost.
In conclusion, we considered a symmetric cooperative game played by three
players in classical and quantum forms. In classical form of this game, which
is also embedded in the quantum form, forming a coalition gives advantage to
players and players are motivated to do so. In quantum form of the game,
however, an initial quantum state can be prepared by the arbiter such that
coalition forming is of no advantage. The interesting function in these situations
i.e. ‘value of coalition’ is greater for coalition then for player outside; when the
game is played classically. These values become same in a quantum form of
the game and motivation to form a coalition is lost. There is, nevertheless, an
essential difference between the two forms of the game i.e. classical game is
zero-sum but its quantum version is not.
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